Be very careful when dealing with police

'Be very careful when dealing with police'
By JIM TUTTLE Staff writer --------------------

If an interaction with a police officer becomes confrontational, silence is the best course of action, according to at least one criminal defense attorney.
Public Opinion sought expert advice on civilians' rights in dealing with police after interviewing people who had come up against law enforcement in the past few months both in and out of the borough. From the 86-year-old woman who had a feud with her neighbors and the neighbors became personally aligned with the state trooper, to the off-duty state trooper calling squad cars out after being questioned for parking in a fire lane, Francina Taylor's is the third story Public Opinion has followed in the past year.
What is the right thing for a citizen to do when faced with the law?
"The best thing is to absolutely say nothing. That's the best thing to do. And if they decide to charge you, OK, go and see an attorney," said Jeff Conrad, a criminal defense attorney with Clymer, Musser, Brown & Conrad in Lancaster.
"People have to be very careful when they're dealing with the police," he said.
Public Opinion sought to answer several basic questions that were raised by Taylor's allegations against Chambersburg Police (see related story).
Conrad, a private attorney, was the only person contacted who was willing to discuss the issues.
When asked to discuss general state law as it pertains to several aspects of the story, Pennsylvania attorney general spokesman Nils Fredricksen said it "wouldn't
be appropriate" for his office to comment on Pennsylvania law.
A spokesperson with the governor's office said the questions should be referred to Pennsylvania State Police, or suggested a call to the attorney general's office. Phone calls to two state police spokesmen were not returned Wednesday night.
A trial attorney with previous experience as a prosecutor, Conrad said all American citizens should be well aware of their rights when they are dealing with law enforcement.
If her story is accurate, Taylor's constitutional rights as an American were "trampled," he said
Conrad said a police officer should not angrily confront a person who has made any type of complaint.
"Police officers have to keep in mind that people have the right to criticize them. They are government entities," he said. "We entrust them with the ability to separate their anger and their emotions from the job they are out to do. It's a trust that cannot be violated."
Still, if a confrontation occurs, silence is the best choice, he said.
A police officer only has to read a person their Miranda warnings if they are questioning them or taking them into custody.
So if someone gets into an argument with a police officer during an encounter, "any word you say, if you're charged, is going to come in against you," Conrad said.
Unless a police officer is in the middle of a "hot pursuit," he or she cannot enter a person's home without permission or a warrant.
"Any officer that violates the sanctity of somebody's dwelling, their home, they run a risk of going afoul of the law," Conrad said.
Police are permitted to go on a person's property to speak with them, as any other person is allowed, but it becomes trespassing if they are told to leave and they don't have a warrant.
"If I said 'stop, don't come on my property, get off my property,' they can't come on any more. At that point they have active notice and before they come back on, they better have a warrant," Conrad said.
He said that if a verbal argument breaks out between the officer and the resident, who then goes inside, an exchange of words should not warrant entry into the home.
"If it's simply words being thrown back and forth on a porch, there's no way an officer can come inside," Conrad said.
He added that if the resident were to strike the officer or point a gun at the officer, entry would be allowed under the law.
Drinking beer on your porch is not a crime, provided you are of legal age to drink, Conrad said.
"I can sit on my front porch and drink a beer if I want to. I'm a private citizen, I pay my taxes. It's still America. We're not run by the Gestapo and we can still live as free citizens," Conrad said.
Jim Tuttle can be reached at jtuttle@publicopinionnews.com or at 262-4754

Judge denies new trial for gothic kitten groomer
By Andrew Staub (Staff Writer) Published: May 13, 2010 Font size: [A] [A] [A]


DAVE SCHERBENCO / the CITIZENS' VOICE A jury convicted Holly Crawford in February of animal cruelty for piercing kittens' ears and necks and docking their tails in December 2008.

Holly Crawford said she expected Judge Tina Polachek Gartley's ruling, but 'we're still hopeful.' Her attorney Jeffrey Conrad said they will appeal the verdict to the state Superior Court.

WILKES-BARRE - A Luzerne County judge denied Holly Crawford's request for a new trial in the woman's high-profile gothic kitten case, though attorneys Wednesday continued to debate if piercing kittens and docking their tails constitutes animal cruelty.
Judge Tina Polachek Gartley upheld a jury's February verdict that found Crawford guilty of one count of animal cruelty and landed her a sentence of at least six months house arrest and shuttered the Sweet Valley woman's animal grooming business for more than two years.
"It's not the court's place, prerogative or ability to take away their (the jury's) discretion," Gartley said before issuing her ruling.
Crawford left the courtroom almost immediately and stood outside the door as she waited for her attorney, Jeffrey Conrad. "We figured that would happen," Crawford said. "We're still hopeful."
The case arose in December 2008, when Crawford was charged with three counts of animal cruelty after piercing kittens' ears and necks and docking their tails. She planned to sell them on eBay as "gothic kittens."
Echoing a disagreement raised during Crawford's three-day trial, Conrad said Crawford willfully pierced the kittens and docked their tails, but she did not act maliciously - required to represent animal cruelty. Prosecutor David Pedri contended Crawford inflicted pain upon the kittens, all to turn a profit.
"They cried. They were infected," Pedri said. "And Ms. Crawford continued to harass."
Crawford will appeal the verdict to the state Superior Court, said Conrad, who believes her trial attorneys, John Pike and Robert Buttner, should have let her take the witness stand.
Crawford's appeal focuses more on clearing her name, rather than eliminating her sentence, Conrad said.
"She doesn't want to fall back into the world believing she's a criminal," he said. "Because she's not."
astaub@citizensvoice.com, 570-821-2052

N.Y. Court Finds Texting While Driving No Basis for Search

Mark Fass

New York Law Journal

May 14, 2010

A Brooklyn, N.Y., judge has granted a motion to suppress in a weapon-possession case, holding that texting while driving was not illegal in June 2009 and could not serve as the basis of a search and seizure.

In any case, Acting Supreme Court Justice Mark Dwyer held that even if texting had been illegal, doing so still would not have supported arresting drivers who text or searching their cars.

Texting while driving was banned in November 2009.

"When the Legislature enacted cell phone legislation and authorized a fine of not more than $150 for an infraction, it could not have thought it was giving police officers the right arbitrarily to arrest drivers for such a violation, to seize their vehicles, and to conduct intrusive searches," Justice Dwyer held in People v. Abdul-Akim, 5518/09.

The judge also found that the arresting officer's mistaken belief that the driver's Virginia license was only a permit and did not authorize him to drive in New York did not justify the subsequent search and arrest.

"This court concludes that the mistake ... was simply not reasonable," Justice Dwyer concluded.

The defendants, Ali Abdul-Akim and Marcus Ayala, were pulled over on the afternoon of June 16, 2009, while driving in the Brownsville section of Brooklyn, when two officers on foot patrol saw the driver, Ayala, operating a cell phone with both hands.

The officers had been shown a photograph of Ayala's passenger, Abdul-Akim, at a roll call that morning and been warned that he might be seeking revenge for the recent murder of his brother.

When asked for his license, Ayala presented the officer with a document that the officer later testified appeared to be a Virginia learner's permit, not a license.

The officer also recognized that Abdul-Akim was wearing a bulletproof vest, which is a felony in New York when another felony, such as weapons possession, is being committed.

The two men were arrested and Ayala's car was brought back to the precinct for inventory and storage. During the inventory search, the police discovered a nine-millimeter gun and one loose bullet in the glove compartment.

The defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence, contending there was no legal basis for the stop and that everything subsequently discovered -- the gun, the vest, the bullet -- was inadmissible.

Dwyer agreed with the defendants and granted their motion. He cited several grounds, but dedicated the largest portion of his analysis to the issue of the officer's mistake regarding the license.

"As noted, in cases like [People v. David, 223 AD2d 551] it has been held that intrusive action may be justified by a 'reasonable' mistake of fact ... The question, therefore, is whether the mistaken determination by [the officer] and his supervisor that defendant Ayala was not a licensed driver was reasonable under the circumstances," Dwyer wrote.

Here, the judge said the mistake was unreasonable.

"First and foremost, the document proffered by defendant Ayala indicated on its face that it was a 'driver's license,'" Dwyer wrote. "Beyond that, defendant Ayala indisputably produced Virginia registration and insurance papers for his vehicle, a circumstance clearly at odds with any thought that he had only a learner's permit."

Dwyer is the former chief of the appeals bureau at the Manhattan District Attorney's Office who was appointed to the Court of Claims last year and assigned to Brooklyn Supreme Court.

Solo-practitioner Kleon C. Andreadis appeared on behalf of the driver, Ayala.

Andreadis said that the fact that the anti-texting law had been passed but not yet enacted was sufficient grounds on its own for granting the motion.

"If they don't have a predicate to stop him," Andreadis said, "everything else falls."

Tarsha N. Ricks of the Legal Aid Society in Brooklyn represented Abdul-Akim.

Brooklyn Assistant District Attorney Cary S. Fischer appeared for the prosecution. An office spokesman said the decision is under review.